POV: You’re Vladimir Putin in 2026
Urals crude went from $55 a barrel on 25 February 2026 to $125 on 7 April, erasing the sanctions discount and handing the Russian budget roughly 1,184 billion rubles — about €13.5 billion, some 0.5% of GDP — between March and June, on Bruegel’s arithmetic. Moscow shelved planned spending cuts. That was the good news, and it was over by July. Russian oil and gas revenue for the first half of 2026 came in 23% below the same period in 2025. Everything else moved the other way. Gazprom shipped 18 billion cubic metres to Europe in 2025, the lowest since 1973, with TurkStream now the only live route; the EU’s stepwise ban took effect on 18 March 2026, ending LNG imports at the end of this year and long-term pipeline contracts in autumn 2027. Nicolás Maduro has been in a Brooklyn federal jail since January. Ali Khamenei was killed on 28 February and his son Mojtaba was named supreme leader on 8 March. Secretary of State Marco Rubio said on 17 March that Cuba needs to “get new people in charge.” On 9 August, Damascus and Moscow agreed to convert Hmeimim and Tartus into joint training centres. And on 25 August, CIA Director John Ratcliffe flew to Moscow and told the heads of the FSB and the SVR that Russia has taken about 1% of Ukraine’s territory in eighteen months, that the life expectancy of a Russian soldier at the front is under 35 minutes, and that it gets worse from here without a serious negotiation.
The obvious objection is that none of this was aimed at Moscow — that Venezuela was about narcotrafficking, Iran was about the nuclear programme, and Cuba was about Cuba, with Russian losses as a byproduct. That objection is strong, and it is why the honest version of this argument is conditional: whether or not Russia was the target, this is the position Russia is now in. Two things cut against the triumphal reading. The war with Iran was the single largest transfer of money to the Russian budget in two years, which is a strange thing to do to a target on purpose. And the hand actually squeezing is not primarily American — the refineries are being hit by Ukrainian drones and the roughly $300 billion in frozen reserves sits mostly in European institutions. Leverage you do not own is leverage you cannot spend at the table. The question worth watching is not whether Putin is weaker. He is. It is what the United States asks for in exchange for relief, and whether the text names Havana, Caracas, Tartus and Hmeimim — or is silent about them.
Eric Garland is an intelligence analyst personally sanctioned by the Russian Federation in May 2022 for his work on Russian intelligence operations. He is the author of the 2016 “Game Theory” thread, named by The New York Times as one of the 25 most important tweets in history.
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SOURCES
U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control, designation of seven Russian oligarchs, twelve companies and seventeen government officials, 6 April 2018.
United States v. Netyksho et al., U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, indictment of twelve GRU officers, 13 July 2018.
Netherlands Public Prosecution Service and the Joint Investigation Team, murder charges in the downing of Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17, 19 June 2019; convictions in absentia, 17 November 2022.
European Court of Human Rights, Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia (applications nos. 8019/16, 43800/14, 28525/20 and 11055/22), judgment of 9 July 2025, holding Russia responsible for the downing of MH17.
Council of the European Union, regulation phasing out Russian gas imports — final adoption 26 January 2026, entry into force 3 February 2026, stepwise ban from 18 March 2026, LNG phase-out ending 2026 and long-term pipeline contracts ending autumn 2027.
Syrian Arab News Agency and the Syrian foreign ministry, announcement of the agreement with Russia converting the Hmeimim air base and the Tartus naval facility into joint training centres, 9 August 2026.
Russian Ministry of Finance, federal budget revenue data, as reported 5 August 2026 — first-half 2026 oil and gas revenue 23% below the first half of 2025; January–July 2026 total 4.6 trillion rubles, down 16.8% year on year; July 2026 revenue 934 billion rubles.
Bruegel, “How much has the Russian budget gained from Iran-war related higher oil prices?”, 8 July 2026 — Urals at $55 on 25 February 2026 and $125 on 7 April 2026; windfall of approximately 1,184 billion rubles (about €13.5 billion), March–June 2026, roughly 0.5% of nominal GDP.
