Is Putin Running Out of Diesel?
Overnight on September 20, Ukraine struck the Moscow oil refinery in Kapotnya, damaging three units including the AVT-6 primary distillation unit, according to the Ukrainian General Staff. President Zelensky confirmed the first publicly acknowledged combat use of the FP-7 ballistic missile, built by the Ukrainian firm Fire Point. Russia’s Defense Ministry claimed 1,110 drones downed across 19 regions, the largest overnight total of the year. The International Energy Agency reported on September 17 that a Russian refinery was hit on average once every three days through the first eight months of 2026, with diesel output down nearly 30% and secondary units averaging six to eight months to repair. Reuters calculated on September 15 that three of the six refineries producing half of Russia’s diesel are crippled, with Kirishi fully halted. Russia has banned exports of gasoline, jet fuel and diesel, and imported 172,000 tonnes of fuel in August, seven times its previous monthly record.
The obvious objection is that Russia’s army will not run out of diesel, and it won’t: the military uses a small share of national output and Russia entered the year with a diesel surplus. The damage is fiscal and logistical, not tactical, and it compounds because each hydrocracker takes half a year to rebuild. What has changed is who owns the leverage. The sanctions, the tariff authority in the Graham Act signed September 18, and the CIA’s warning delivered in Moscow are all discretionary instruments held in Washington. The refinery campaign is not. Ukraine’s own missile output, on the government’s figures, went from roughly $1 billion in 2022 to about $12 billion actually produced in 2025 against $35 billion of stated capacity. When the White House asked Kyiv on September 13 to stop striking diesel infrastructure, Kyiv said it would stop when Russia did. The question to watch is no longer whether Russia can outlast Western patience, but whether it can outlast its own refining sector, its recruitment math, and a neighbor whose weapons have no off switch in another capital.
Eric Garland is an intelligence analyst personally sanctioned by the Russian Federation in May 2022 for his work on Russian intelligence operations. He is the author of the 2016 “Game Theory” thread, named by The New York Times as one of the 25 most important tweets in history.
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SOURCES
International Energy Agency, “Russian refining sector struggles amid intensifying Ukrainian attacks,” September 17, 2026 Ukrainian General Staff statement and Zelensky statement on X, September 20, 2026, as reported by Bloomberg White House, “Congressional Bill H.R. 5334 Signed into Law” (Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026), September 18, 2026 Reuters, calculations on Russian diesel output, September 15, 2026, via Meduza Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air, “August 2026 — Monthly analysis of Russian fossil fuel exports and sanctions” Kpler shipping data via The National, “China’s Iranian oil imports nearly halve since war,” August 26, 2026 NPR, “House passes Russia sanctions, sending bill named for Lindsey Graham to Trump’s desk,” September 16, 2026 Ukrainska Pravda, “Engineers, missile strikes and high technology: can Ukraine produce more weapons in 2026?”, January 4, 2026 Meduza, Putin remarks on European troops in Ukraine, September 14, 2026; Trump request to Kyiv on diesel strikes and Kyiv’s response, September 13, 2026
