The Office of Strategic Services: Donovan, the CIA, and the 2026 Revival

The Office of Strategic Services (OSS) was the first central intelligence organization the United States ever built. It existed for three years and three months, from June 1942 to October 1945. At its peak it employed almost 13,000 people, put scholars, spies, saboteurs, and propagandists under one director, and reported to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. President Truman abolished it a month after the war ended. Its pieces went to the State and War Departments, and two years later the most important of them became the core of the Central Intelligence Agency.
On 12 November 2026, the name came back. The Department of War announced that its top civilian for special operations would now carry the title Assistant Secretary of War for the Office of Strategic Services, with a higher rank, more staff, and a bigger budget.
This page covers why the OSS was needed, what William J. Donovan built, why it was shut down, how its people and files became the CIA, and what the 2026 revival does and does not bring back.
At a glance
- Predecessor: Office of the Coordinator of Information (COI), created 11 July 1941.
- Created: 13 June 1942, by Presidential military order, under the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- Director: William J. Donovan, the only director it ever had.
- Size: almost 13,000 personnel at the end of 1944, about 7,500 of them overseas and about 4,500 of them women. It spent about $135 million over its life (CIA History Staff, 2000).
- Abolished: Executive Order 9621, signed 20 September 1945, effective 1 October 1945.
- Successors: the State Department’s intelligence research office, the War Department’s Strategic Services Unit, the Central Intelligence Group (1946), the CIA (1947), and Army Special Forces (1952).
- Revived (as a title): memo signed 2 November 2026, announced 12 November 2026.
Why the United States needed it
Before 1941, the United States had intelligence collectors but no system for national intelligence. The Office of Naval Intelligence, the War Department’s Military Intelligence Division (G-2), the FBI, and the State Department each gathered information for their own chiefs. Each reported up its own chain. Nobody below the President was responsible for putting the pieces together, and the President had no staff to do it for him. The CIA’s own history of the OSS describes Roosevelt’s frustration with services that would not cooperate and left him to referee their quarrels (CIA History Staff, 2000).
That is a structural problem, and it is the same one Competitive Futures sees in large organizations today: plenty of information, distributed across units with their own incentives, and no function whose job is to fuse it into a judgment the leader can act on. In 1941 the cost of that problem was about to become visible. The signals that preceded Pearl Harbor existed in pieces across several agencies. No one was assigned to assemble them.
Roosevelt’s first answer, the Coordinator of Information, came five months before the attack. On 11 July 1941 he created COI and put Donovan in charge of collecting and analyzing information bearing on national security (National Archives, Bradsher). By late 1941 it had about 600 staff and a $10 million budget.
William J. Donovan
Donovan was an unlikely founder for a spy service and an ideal one for an organization that had to be built from nothing in a hurry.
A Buffalo native and Columbia Law graduate, he commanded a battalion of the 165th Infantry, the “Fighting 69th,” in the First World War and received the Medal of Honor. After the war he was an assistant attorney general under Coolidge, then a prominent antitrust lawyer in New York, and in 1932 the losing Republican candidate for governor of New York (CIA History Staff, 2000). He was, in other words, a Republican Wall Street lawyer with combat credentials, which gave a Democratic president political cover and gave Donovan standing with the military.
His real qualification was what he did in 1940 and 1941. Roosevelt sent him to Britain in the summer of 1940 to judge whether the country would hold out against Germany. Donovan came back convinced that it would, and he came back with a close view of how the British ran intelligence, subversion, and propaganda. Early in 1941 he toured the Balkans and Britain’s Mediterranean outposts. He turned what he saw into an argument for an American service that would combine collection, analysis, and unconventional operations under one strategic direction.
When COI became the OSS on 13 June 1942, Roosevelt’s military order moved it under the Joint Chiefs. It gave the office two duties: to collect and analyze the strategic information the Joint Chiefs required, and to plan and operate the special services they directed. It named Donovan Director of Strategic Services (Order Establishing the OSS, 13 June 1942). COI’s propaganda broadcasting, including the new Voice of America, went to the Office of War Information instead.
Donovan’s own description of the mission was characteristically broad. The name, he said, meant “every service of a strategic nature, tried or untried.” He was promoted to brigadier general in March 1943 and major general in November 1944.
What the OSS actually did
The OSS was several organizations under one roof. The branches mattered more than the name, and they matter again for understanding what the 2026 revival does and does not bring back.
- Research and Analysis (R&A). About 900 scholars, led by the Harvard historian William Langer, produced finished analysis from open and secret sources. Its Enemy Objectives Unit helped pick German oil as a bombing target. R&A was the most original thing Donovan built: a government analytic staff, recruited from universities, writing for strategy rather than for one department.
- Secret Intelligence (SI). Espionage. SI ran agents in neutral capitals and, late in the war, dropped nearly 200 agents into Germany.
- X-2. Counterintelligence, created early in 1943 so the OSS could be trusted with ULTRA material from the British. It trained in London alongside the British services and learned from Britain’s Double Cross system. James Jesus Angleton came out of X-2.
- Special Operations (SO), Operational Groups, and the Jedburghs. Sabotage, guerrilla support, and commando work, often with Britain’s Special Operations Executive. In the summer of 1944, 93 three-man Jedburgh teams parachuted into France to work with the Resistance.
- Morale Operations (MO). “Black” propaganda aimed at enemy populations and troops.
- Research and Development and the Maritime Unit. Gadgets, forgeries, and seaborne infiltration.
The record includes the “vice consuls” in North Africa who prepared the ground for Operation TORCH in 1942; Virginia Hall’s work with the French Resistance, which earned her the Distinguished Service Cross; Detachment 101 in Burma, which recruited almost 11,000 Kachin fighters; and Operation SUNRISE, Allen Dulles’s secret negotiations from Bern that ended the war in Italy in late April 1945 (CIA History Staff, 2000). It also includes plenty of amateurism, blown operations, and casualties. Of the agents SI dropped into Germany, 36 were killed, captured, or went missing.
The fight over the postwar service
Donovan never intended the OSS to be temporary. On 18 November 1944 he sent Roosevelt a plan for a permanent, peacetime central intelligence service. Its director would report to the President, coordinate the departments’ intelligence, and run foreign intelligence and subversive operations, with full authority in intelligence matters subject only to presidential control (Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945–1950: Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment; CIA FOIA, the Donovan Plan).
The plan set off a bureaucratic war. The Army and Navy wanted any central body to coordinate rather than command, and their official position was that the question could wait until after the war. The State Department wanted the analytic function for itself. In December 1944, FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover proposed a worldwide intelligence system run by the FBI on the model of its Latin American operations (CIA FOIA, Misc-006).
Then the plan leaked. On 9 February 1945, the Chicago Tribune and the Washington Times-Herald published the text of Donovan’s memorandum and his draft order under Walter Trohan’s byline, presenting it as a scheme for an all-powerful postwar spy service. Members of Congress warned of an American “gestapo” (Kirkpatrick, CIA). Later accounts attribute the leak to Hoover himself; that has never been documented.
Roosevelt did not drop the idea. On 5 April 1945 he wrote to Donovan asking him to gather the chiefs of the foreign intelligence and internal security units and collect their views on a centralized service (CIA). Seven days later Roosevelt was dead, and with him went the OSS’s protection.
The shutdown
Truman had no attachment to Donovan or his agency. The CIA’s own history says plainly that Truman disliked Donovan and felt no obligation to preserve the OSS after Roosevelt’s death (CIA History Staff, 2000). The Bureau of the Budget, which had been planning the postwar intelligence structure on its own, brought Truman a liquidation plan, and he approved it in September.
Executive Order 9621, signed 20 September 1945, terminated the OSS and the office of the Director of Strategic Services, effective 1 October. That gave Donovan ten days. The order split the agency in two (EO 9621):
- To the State Department: the Research and Analysis Branch and the Presentation Branch, as an Interim Research and Intelligence Service. This analytic core is the ancestor of State’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research.
- To the War Department: everything else, with authority for the Secretary of War to wind down whatever he judged unnecessary.
The operational capability was nearly lost. Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy kept Secret Intelligence and X-2 together as the Strategic Services Unit (SSU), first under Brig. Gen. John Magruder and then Col. William Quinn. The SSU preserved the networks, files, and trained officers the OSS had built in Europe and Asia while Washington argued about what came next.
Donovan went back to his law practice. He was never given a role in the institutions that inherited his work.
The hand-off to the CIA
The argument Donovan started in 1944 was settled in two steps, and in both, the answer looked a good deal like his plan.
- The Central Intelligence Group (January 1946). On 22 January 1946, Truman issued a directive to the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy creating a National Intelligence Authority and a Central Intelligence Group under a Director of Central Intelligence. In 1946 the SSU’s people and functions moved into CIG’s Office of Special Operations, and the SSU was dissolved that October.
- The National Security Act of 1947. Signed 26 July 1947, the Act created the Central Intelligence Agency, which came into existence on 18 September 1947. It also created the National Security Council and the National Military Establishment, which became the Department of Defense in 1949. The Department of War’s name went into the history books with it.
The CIA’s historians describe the agency’s inheritance from the OSS as both direct and cultural: key personnel, files, funds, procedures, and foreign contacts moved over, along with a professional identity (CIA History Staff, 2000). Four OSS veterans later became Director of Central Intelligence: Allen Dulles, Richard Helms, William Colby, and William Casey.
The special-operations lineage took a separate road. OSS veterans, among them the former Jedburgh Aaron Bank, built Army Special Forces, whose first group was activated in 1952. Congress created U.S. Special Operations Command and the civilian post of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict in 1986, and both stood up in 1987. That split between Title 50 intelligence and covert action at the CIA and Title 10 military special operations at the Pentagon is the background to what happened this month.
The 2026 revival
On 12 November 2026, the Department of War released a memorandum from Secretary of War Pete Hegseth, signed 2 November, under the headline that it would “revitalize the legacy of the Office of Strategic Services.” Hegseth announced it on X with the line “The OSS is back.” The memo itself calls the elevation “a bold, foundational change” (Secretary of War memorandum, 2 Nov 2026).
What the memo does, according to the department’s release and reporting on the memo (Task & Purpose; SOF News):
- New title. The Assistant Secretary of War for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict becomes the Assistant Secretary of War for the Office of Strategic Services, ASW(OSS). The staff beneath it, the Secretariat for Special Operations, becomes the Office of Strategic Services. Both are secondary titles for public communications, correspondence, ceremonies, and non-statutory documents, the same device the administration used for “Department of War” in September 2025.
- Higher rank. The office moves to “Code 2” in the department’s order of precedence, on par with the secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force and the under secretaries.
- People and money. At least $45 million a year, reallocated from elsewhere in the department, and 100 new billets: 75 civilian positions, at least five of them senior executives, to be filled within 60 days, plus 25 joint military positions.
- Seats where decisions are made. The ASW(OSS) gets a seat on the boards that set requirements and cut budgets, including the Joint Requirements Oversight Council and the Program Budget Review, and a role in Special Access Program governance.
- A legislative ask. The department is preparing proposals for Congress to create a permanent Under Secretary of Strategic Services.
The office is held by Derrick Anderson, an Army Special Forces veteran confirmed by the Senate in December 2025, who served earlier on the National Security Council staff as a counterterrorism director. The memo’s rationale is that special operations resourcing has lagged operational demand. Task & Purpose reports that commanders have been turning down missions every month because the force is stretched.
What the memo does not do. The office’s legal name under 10 U.S.C. § 139b remains the Secretariat for Special Operations until Congress amends the statute. The Under Secretary post requires legislation. And the memo creates no new intelligence agency. It does not transfer espionage, covert action, or national analysis from the CIA or anywhere else. The new OSS is the Pentagon’s civilian oversight and advocacy office for special operations forces, with more rank and resources than it had.
The move continues a long effort by Congress to give that office real authority. The FY2017 National Defense Authorization Act gave the assistant secretary service-secretary-like control over special-operations-peculiar administration. In 2020, Acting Secretary Christopher Miller had the office report directly to him; the next administration kept some of those changes and reversed others. A 2024 GAO report found widespread confusion about the office’s administrative role and inadequate staffing to oversee SOCOM (Task & Purpose). The memo cites direction in the FY2025 NDAA.
Reading the revival
The name carries more history than the office does, so the useful question is which part of the OSS has actually come back.
The original OSS joined four functions: strategic analysis (R&A), espionage (SI), counterintelligence (X-2), and unconventional warfare (SO and the Operational Groups). Truman’s order and the 1947 Act deliberately pulled them apart, sending analysis toward State and later the CIA, espionage and counterintelligence to the CIA, and special operations, eventually, to the military. The 2026 memo revives the name for the inheritor of only the last of those four. The memo itself describes the OSS as USSOCOM’s predecessor; it was equally the CIA’s.
That raises the question Small Wars Journal put most directly: whether the elevation signals a Pentagon move toward responsibilities beyond its Title 10 authority, given that the OSS’s mission was split between Title 10 military operations and Title 50 covert action (Small Wars Journal, 13 Nov 2026). The memo doesn’t claim any Title 50 role. Supporters of the change have argued for years that special operations needed a stronger civilian champion in the budget process; that is the problem the memo’s provisions actually address.
What to watch:
- Congress. Whether the FY2027 NDAA codifies the title and creates the Under Secretary. A secondary title can be reversed by the next secretary; a statute cannot.
- Budget behavior. Whether a seat on JROC and the Program Budget Review moves real money toward special operations requirements, which is the memo’s stated purpose.
- Scope creep, or its absence. Whether the office acquires intelligence, information-operations, or covert-action-adjacent responsibilities that would make the historical name more than ceremonial, and how the CIA and the congressional intelligence committees respond if it does.
- The missing branch. Nothing in the revival recreates R&A, the part of the OSS that turned scattered information into strategic judgment. That function survives today in the CIA’s analytic directorate, State’s INR, and the National Intelligence Council, not in the Pentagon’s new office.
What the OSS teaches about building an intelligence function
Donovan’s problem is one every leadership team faces in some form, and his solutions and his failures both carry over.
- Fusion is the product. The OSS existed because information scattered across agencies with their own chains of command does not add up by itself. Someone has to be responsible for the whole picture.
- Analysis deserves its own institution. Donovan’s most lasting innovation was a professional analytic staff writing for strategy, separate from the people collecting the information. Organizations that let collectors grade their own work get the analytic failures that Richards Heuer later catalogued.
- Capability without a constituency doesn’t survive. The OSS did good work and was abolished in ten days. It had one patron, the President, and when he died it had none. A strategic function needs support across the organization, not just from one executive.
- Leaks and framing can decide institutional fights. The 1945 leak didn’t change what Donovan proposed. It changed what Congress and the public thought he proposed.
- Names are not authorities. In 1945 the capability survived under a dull name (the Strategic Services Unit) because someone kept the people and files together. In 2026 a famous name has been restored to an office whose authorities still depend on Congress. In both cases the substance sits in statute, budget lines, and people, not in the title on the door.
Frequently asked questions
What was the Office of Strategic Services?
The Office of Strategic Services (OSS) was the United States’ central intelligence and special operations organization in World War II. Created on 13 June 1942 under the Joint Chiefs of Staff and led by William J. Donovan, it combined strategic analysis, espionage, counterintelligence, sabotage, guerrilla support, and propaganda. It employed almost 13,000 people at its peak.
Who was “Wild Bill” Donovan?
William J. Donovan (1883–1959) was a Medal of Honor recipient from World War I, a New York lawyer, and a former assistant attorney general who persuaded President Roosevelt to create a central intelligence service. He led the Coordinator of Information from 1941 and the OSS from 1942 until it was abolished in 1945, and his 1944 plan for a peacetime service anticipated much of the CIA.
Why was the OSS shut down?
President Truman abolished the OSS by Executive Order 9621, signed 20 September 1945 and effective 1 October. The Army, Navy, State Department, and FBI all opposed a powerful independent service, a 1945 press leak had framed Donovan’s postwar plan as a peacetime “gestapo,” and Truman had no attachment to Donovan or the agency once Roosevelt died.
Is the CIA the successor to the OSS?
Largely, yes. After the OSS was abolished, its espionage and counterintelligence branches survived as the War Department’s Strategic Services Unit, which moved into the Central Intelligence Group in 1946. The National Security Act of 1947 then created the CIA, which inherited OSS personnel, files, procedures, and foreign contacts. Four OSS veterans later became Director of Central Intelligence. Army Special Forces and U.S. Special Operations Command also trace their lineage to the OSS.
Has the OSS been brought back?
In name, for special operations. A memorandum signed by Secretary of War Pete Hegseth on 2 November 2026 and announced on 12 November gives the Pentagon’s Assistant Secretary for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict the secondary title Assistant Secretary of War for the Office of Strategic Services, raises the office’s rank, and adds staff and funding. It is not a new intelligence agency, and a permanent name change or a new Under Secretary of Strategic Services would require an act of Congress.
Work with Competitive Futures
Donovan’s argument was that a leader facing a complex, hostile environment needs one function responsible for turning scattered information into strategic judgment. We build and run that function for organizations that don’t have one. Request a 20-minute conversation.
Related analysis from Competitive Futures
- J. Edgar Hoover: Building American Counterintelligence
- James Jesus Angleton: Counterintelligence in a Wilderness of Mirrors
- Richards Heuer: The CIA Officer Who Taught Analysts How Their Minds Fail
- Analysis of Competing Hypotheses
- Cognitive Bias: A Field Guide for Leaders
References
- Roosevelt, F. D. (1942, June 13). Military Order establishing the Office of Strategic Services. The American Presidency Project; CIA FOIA Reading Room.
- Donovan, W. J. (1944, November 18). Memorandum for the President [the Donovan Plan]. CIA FOIA Reading Room, CIA-RDP90-00610R000100200003-2.
- Roosevelt, F. D. (1945, April 5). Memorandum to Maj. Gen. William J. Donovan.
- Truman, H. S. (1945, September 20). Executive Order 9621: Termination of the Office of Strategic Services and Disposition of Its Functions. The American Presidency Project.
- Truman, H. S. (1946, January 22). Presidential directive establishing the National Intelligence Authority and Central Intelligence Group.
- National Security Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-253.
- U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945–1950: Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment.
- Secretary of War. (2026, November 2). Memorandum: Elevation of the Assistant Secretary of War for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict and Strengthening Departmental Support of the Special Operations Enterprise.
- U.S. Department of War. (2026, November 12). Secretary of War Pete Hegseth elevates special operations leadership to revitalize the legacy of the Office of Strategic Services [press release].
- Warner, M. (2000). The Office of Strategic Services: America’s First Intelligence Agency. CIA History Staff, Center for the Study of Intelligence.
- Kirkpatrick, L. B. Origins, Missions, and Structure of CIA. CIA Historical Review Program (released 1993).
- Bradsher, G. (2021, August 24). The creation of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). National Archives, The Text Message.
- Small Wars Journal staff. (2026, November 13). ASD SO/LIC reorganized as Office of Strategic Services.
- SOF News. (2026, November). ASD SO/LIC status elevated within DoD.
- Task & Purpose. (2026, November). The Pentagon brings back World War II-era OSS for special operations missions, funding.
- SOFREP. (2026, November 14). The OSS name is back for special ops. Congress holds the keys.
- Troy, T. F. (1981). Donovan and the CIA: A History of the Establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency. CIA Center for the Study of Intelligence.
- Waller, D. (2011). Wild Bill Donovan: The Spymaster Who Created the OSS and Modern American Espionage. Free Press.
- Smith, R. H. (1972). OSS: The Secret History of America’s First Central Intelligence Agency. University of California Press.
This piece is part of our guide to The Pioneers of Strategy, Intelligence, and Foresight.